Copyright 2013 by Northwestern University School of Law
Northwestern University Law Review

Printed in U.S.A.
Vol. 107, No. 4

CRACKING OPEN THE CLASSROOM DOOR:
DEVELOPING A FIRST AMENDMENT
STANDARD FOR CURRICULAR SPEECH
Nicholas K. Tygesson
ABSTRACT—Around this country, courts have found that the
discharge of public school teachers for their classroom speech does not
implicate the First Amendment. Others have protected this speech, but only
by importing analytical approaches from other areas of law ill suited to the
unique interests at play in America’s public schools. The resulting
patchwork of doctrinal approaches provides little clarity for courts and only
illusory protection for teachers. This Note will start from scratch,
examining the first principles at play in public school classrooms and
tailoring a First Amendment approach to respect the needs of government,
teachers, and students. When determining if the First Amendment protects
classroom speech, the teacher’s interest in speaking on matters of
legitimate pedagogical concern should be balanced against the school’s
interest in providing an effective educational environment
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INTRODUCTION
In 2002, Deborah Mayer accepted a teaching position at Clear Creek
Elementary School in Bloomington, Indiana.1 Almost every Friday, Mayer
used a newsletter—part of her approved curriculum—to teach her students
about current events.2 During one Friday session, her class read an article
about peace demonstrations in protest of the Iraq War.3 When one of her
students asked whether she had ever participated in a peace march, Mayer
responded, “When I drive past the courthouse square and the demonstrators
are picketing I honk my horn for peace because their signs say, ‘Honk for
Peace.’”4 The class then spent a few minutes discussing the importance of
conflict resolution and a school program to train children to be mediators
on the playground.5 After parents complained about the views Mayer
expressed during this discussion, the school’s principal banned her from
discussing peace and cancelled the school’s annual peace month.6 Mayer’s
relationship with the principal continued to deteriorate, and the school

1

See Mayer v. Monroe Cnty. Cmty. Sch. Corp., No. 1:04-CV-1695-SEB-VSS, 2006 WL 693555,
at *2 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 10, 2006).
2
See id.
3
See id.
4
Id.
5
See id.
6
See id. at *3.
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board did not renew her contract. She claimed she lost her job because of
the reaction to her class discussion.7
Elsewhere, teachers have experienced adverse employment actions
under similar circumstances. One teacher chose to assign Herman Hesse’s
Siddhartha—a book purchased by her school board—to her high school
English class and was ultimately fired after parent complaints about the
book’s allegedly offensive content.8 Another high school teacher selected a
play for her advanced theater class that touched on issues of sexuality and
single-parent families.9 The class performed the play at a regional
competition and won seventeen awards.10 Although her principal had
approved the play and she had complied with district policies, the district
transferred the teacher to another school because of the play’s content.11
These three educators each claimed they suffered an adverse
employment action as a result of expression directed towards students to
effectuate their curriculum (curricular speech).12 As a result, these teachers
filed suit claiming that their employers acted in retaliation against the
exercise of their First Amendment right to freedom of speech and
expression.13 In all three cases, federal appellate courts ultimately rejected
7

Id. at *3–9.
See Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ. (Evans-Marshall I), 428 F.3d 223, 226–30 (6th Cir. 2005).
The court does not specify precisely what about the book was found to be offensive—presumably some
aspect of its sexual or religious content.
9
See Boring v. Buncombe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 366 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
10
Id.
11
Id. at 375–76 (Motz, J., dissenting) (“Taking all of these allegations together, a fair reading of
them is that Boring complied with the school administration’s requirements and policies in every
respect . . . .”).
12
For the purposes of this Note, curriculum will be defined as “all planned school activities
including . . . courses of study, organized play, athletics, dramatics, clubs, and homeroom program.” Id.
at 367–68 (majority opinion) (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 557
(1971)). Accord Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (viewing a student newspaper
as part of the curriculum). As speech has been construed by the Court to go beyond words spoken or
written by the speaker, curricular speech includes all expressive activities of an educator used in
implementing the educator’s curriculum, including choice of materials and media. Cf. Texas v. Johnson,
491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (“[W]e have acknowledged that conduct may be ‘sufficiently imbued with
elements of communication to fall within the scope of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.’” (quoting
Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974) (per curiam))). This definition specifically excludes
speech made by teachers related to other aspects of employment, which would continue to be analyzed
under the current government employee speech framework. See infra Part I.A.1.
13
Often, the issue of whether an educator’s First Amendment rights were violated arises when a
public employee claims the employee suffered an adverse employment action because the employee
exercised his or her rights. Whether an employee engaged in protected activity—in these cases, the
exercise of the First Amendment right to free speech—is only the first element of a successful
retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Additionally, a plaintiff must successfully demonstrate that
the plaintiff suffered “an injury that would likely chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing in
that [protected] activity” and that the adverse action was substantially motivated by the protected
conduct. Evans-Marshall I, 428 F.3d at 228 (quoting Cockrel v. Shelby Cnty. Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036,
1048 (6th Cir. 2001)). For additional discussion of the causation prong, see infra note 47.
8

1919

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

the notion that the teachers’ circumstances triggered First Amendment
protection.14
These cases demonstrate the troubled state of First Amendment
protection for educators. First, school districts can discharge teachers for
using their professional judgment in exposing students to culturally
significant topics, often with the permission of their administration.
Teaching is dynamic, and teachers are expected to engage young people
with stimulating ideas and instruction. As they grow older, students
frequently inquire about important, and at times controversial, topics
related to religion, politics, and sexuality. While teachers should not be
allowed to use their classrooms to proselytize to a captive audience, neglect
the topic they are hired to teach, or expose students to materials
inappropriate for their age, they should be encouraged to introduce
America’s youth to diverse perspectives and experiences vital to the
success of a democratic society. Using contemporary, engaging, and
relevant materials can increase student achievement across disciplines.
Teachers have recently come under increased public scrutiny and pressure
as reformers seek to improve public schools. The focus on improving test
scores to comply with No Child Left Behind15 as well as movements
opposing tenure16 and unionization17 have already lessened teachers’
autonomy; fear of retaliation for effectuating their curriculum in a
reasonable manner need not further that trend.18
Second, the outcome in these cases may have differed had they arisen
elsewhere in the United States. Federal circuit courts have applied no fewer
than four distinct doctrinal approaches to determine whether the First
Amendment’s Free Speech Clause protects curricular speech:

14

See Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ. (Evans-Marshall II), 624 F.3d 332, 334, 344 (6th Cir. 2010);
Mayer v. Monroe Cnty. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477, 480 (7th Cir. 2007); Boring, 136 F.3d at 368.
15
No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.). The No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) was passed to
improve American education by implementing standards-based reforms. See No Child Left Behind,
EDUC. WEEK (published Aug. 4, 2004; updated Sept. 19, 2011), http://www.edweek.org/ew/issues/nochild-left-behind/. NCLB makes federal education funding contingent on states implementing
standardized tests that allow the tracking of assessment data for individual students. See id. Failure to
meet annual goals for improving test scores may result in punishment, including state takeovers of a
failing school. See id.
16
See, e.g., M.J. Stephey, A Brief History of Tenure, TIME (Nov. 17, 2008), http://www.time.com/
time/nation/article/0,8599,1859505,00.html (discussing the efforts of Michelle Rhee—former head of
Washington, D.C.’s public schools—to abolish tenure).
17
See, e.g., George F. Will, Op-Ed, Liberals’ Waterloo, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 2011, at A15
(discussing a political controversy in Wisconsin that included teachers’ collective bargaining rights).
18
It has been suggested that this confluence of factors has contributed to a 15% drop in teacher job
satisfaction over the past two years. See Kevin Welner, Teacher Job Satisfaction Plummets (Perhaps
Teacher-Bashing Isn’t Productive), HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 7, 2012, 10:35 AM), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/kevin-welner/teacher-job-satisfaction-_b_1312266.html.
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(1) the Pickering balancing test, which protects speech made by a
public employee when speaking as a citizen on a matter of public
concern;19
(2) the Pickering–Garcetti approach, which applies the Pickering test
but finds all speech made pursuant to a government employee’s official
duties as outside the scope of the First Amendment;20
(3) the Hazelwood test, which states that schools can restrict
educators’ speech based on a legitimate pedagogical concern;21 and
(4) the Rust approach, which views curricular speech as government
speech that affords the speaker no First Amendment protection.22
Furthermore, different circuits have applied identical tests in radically
different ways.23 Alternative First Amendment protections under the banner
of academic freedom24 or a student’s right to be exposed to diverse ideas25
are tenuous at best. This total uncertainty can chill educators’ speech and
hamper their ability to find creative ways to engage young people without
jeopardizing their careers.26
This Note will attempt to disentangle this convoluted doctrine and
propose a new standard for the analysis of K–12 educators’ free speech
rights. When determining if the First Amendment protects curricular
speech, the teacher’s interest in speaking on matters of legitimate
pedagogical concern should be balanced against the school’s interest in
providing an effective educational environment. Additionally, the proposed
analysis will be specifically tailored to the realities of the schoolhouse.27 In
19

See, e.g., Borden v. Sch. Dist. of Twp. of E. Brunswick, 523 F.3d 153, 168 (3d Cir. 2008); Lee v.
York Cnty. Sch. Div., 484 F.3d 687, 694 n.11 (4th Cir. 2007); Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist.,
890 F.2d 794, 799 (5th Cir. 1989).
20
See, e.g., Evans-Marshall II, 624 F.3d 332, 341 (6th Cir. 2010); Mayer v. Monroe Cnty. Cmty.
Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477, 478–80 (7th Cir. 2007).
21
See, e.g., Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized Sch. Dist., 147 F.3d 718, 724 (8th Cir. 1998); Silano v.
Sag Harbor Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 42 F.3d 719, 722–23 (2d Cir. 1994); Ward v. Hickey,
996 F.2d 448, 452 (1st Cir. 1993); Miles v. Denver Pub. Sch., 944 F.2d 773, 775–79 (10th Cir. 1991).
22
See, e.g., Downs v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 1013 (9th Cir. 2000).
23
Compare Evans-Marshall I, 428 F.3d 223, 231 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding that controversial
curricular speech was a matter of public concern), with Kirkland, 890 F.2d at 799–802 (finding that
controversial curricular speech was not a matter of public concern).
24
See, e.g., Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (plurality opinion).
25
See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
26
See Karen C. Daly, Balancing Act: Teachers’ Classroom Speech and the First Amendment,
30 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 7 (2001) (“In the absence of a Supreme Court decision clarifying teachers’ rights, inclass speech is chilled and the balance of interests between school boards and teachers is impermissibly
tilted in favor of the former.”).
27
A number of other commentators have put forth new modes of analysis for curricular speech
claims that focus primarily on the addition of a notice requirement to existing approaches. See, e.g., id.
at 52; Kimberly Gee, Establishing a Constitutional Standard that Protects Public School Teacher
Classroom Expression, 38 J.L. & EDUC. 409, 412–13 (2009); Kevin G. Welner, Locking Up the
Marketplace of Ideas and Locking Out School Reform: Courts’ Imprudent Treatment of Controversial
Teaching in America’s Public Schools, 50 UCLA L. REV. 959, 1022–29 (2003). While incorporating
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proposing this test, this Note works within existing Supreme Court doctrine
while seeking to balance the interests of teachers, government, and
students.
This Note will proceed in four parts. Part I discusses the current
approaches to analyzing curricular speech under the Free Speech Clause
and the related concepts of academic freedom and a student’s “right to
hear.” Part II outlines the general principles and particularized concerns
implicated by curricular speech. Part III proposes a new standard to
evaluate curricular speech protection that incorporates the basic principles
and concerns discussed in Part II, demonstrates how the test would be
applied, and explores its benefits. Part IV concludes.
I. FIRST AMENDMENT APPROACHES TO CURRICULAR SPEECH
The First Amendment states, “Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech.”28 The application of First Amendment
protections to public employees has evolved greatly over the last century.
Until the 1960s, the government had broad latitude in restricting the
constitutional rights of its employees.29 Oliver Wendell Holmes succinctly
articulated this position, writing that a police officer “may have a
constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a
policeman.”30 Likewise, the Supreme Court offered little in the way of First
Amendment protection to public employees. In Adler v. Board of
Education, the Court upheld a New York law prohibiting members of
“subversive groups,” such as the Communist Party, from being employed
by public schools.31
This paradigm shifted following the Court’s 1967 decision in
Keyishian v. Board of Regents.32 Overruling its decision in Adler, the Court
struck down laws requiring faculty at state universities to sign a certificate
notice, this Note goes beyond previous efforts by creating a test that delineates protected and
unprotected speech on the merits of the expression itself.
28
U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment has been the primary constitutional provision used
to provide some level of protection to teaching in the United States. A number of other nations have
explicit textual commitments to protecting teaching and academic inquiry in their constitutions. See,
e.g., GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC LAW],
May 23, 1949, BGBl. I, art. 5(3) (Ger.) (stating that “[a]rt and science, research and teaching shall be
free” under the German Basic Law); Art. 33 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.) (stating that “[a]rt and science and
the teaching of them shall enjoy complete freedom” under the Italian Constitution).
29
See Martha M. McCarthy & Suzanne E. Eckes, Silence in the Hallways: The Impact of Garcetti
v. Ceballos on Public School Educators, 17 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 209, 210 (2008); see also Connick v.
Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983) (“For most of this century, the unchallenged dogma was that a public
employee had no right to object to conditions placed upon the terms of employment—including those
which restricted the exercise of constitutional rights.”).
30
McAuliffe v. City of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892).
31
342 U.S. 485, 485–93 (1952) (“Has the State thus deprived them of any right to free speech or
assembly? We think not.”).
32
385 U.S. 589 (1967).
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stating they were not communists, explaining that “[b]ecause First
Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, government may
regulate in the area only with narrow specificity.”33 The Court rejected “the
theory that public employment which may be denied altogether may be
subjected to any conditions, regardless of how unreasonable.”34
By protecting the rights of public employees generally, Keyishian
opened the door for the development of more refined analyses of First
Amendment claims concerning curricular speech.35 However, the Court has
yet to rule on a case involving a K–12 teacher’s curricular speech.36 The
Court’s lack of guidance has resulted in federal circuit courts using a
hodgepodge of approaches to determine whether the First Amendment
shields this expression. Three distinct strands of First Amendment doctrine
provide potential protection for curricular speech: free speech, academic
freedom, and the right to hear.
A. Free Speech Standards for Curricular Speech
Given the absence of Supreme Court direction, lower courts have
imported analytical frameworks from different areas of First Amendment
free speech law into the curricular speech context. Each approach
employed in the circuits reflects one element of the relationship between a
teacher and the state. The Pickering line of cases balances the interests of
government as sovereign and employer. Hazelwood examines the interests
of the state in education. Meanwhile, Rust focuses on the state controlling
the message of programs it funds. Each of these tests is appealing because
it captures an important element of the educational setting: teachers are
government employees, public schools are at the heart of our education
system, and state, local, and national governments provide nearly all
funding for public education. However, each test fails to capture all of
these interests at once. Thus, a split developed in the circuit courts and each
approach requires examination.
1.

Teacher
as
Public
Employee:
Pickering
and
Garcetti.—Pickering’s public employee speech framework is the
most commonly used tool used by courts to analyze curricular speech. In
1968, the Court announced its landmark decision in Pickering v. Board of
Education.37 In Pickering, a public school teacher lost his job after writing
a letter to a local newspaper criticizing the board of education and
33

Id. at 604 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
Id. at 605–06 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 345 F.2d 236, 239 (2d Cir. 1965)).
35
See id. at 606 (“It is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may
be infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege.” (quoting Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963))).
36
Daly, supra note 26, at 6.
37
391 U.S. 563 (1968).
34
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superintendent for their handling of a bond referendum and financial
expenditures.38 Eschewing the standard public forum analysis due to the
state’s dual interests as employer and sovereign, the Court set up a test
balancing the employee’s interest “as a citizen, in commenting upon
matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in
promoting the efficiency of the public services.”39 Emphasizing that each
application of this test must be context specific, the Court looked to
whether the statements would make it difficult to “maintain[] either
discipline by immediate superiors or harmony among coworkers” as well
as interfere with the “performance of his daily duties in the classroom
or . . . with the regular operation of the schools generally.”40 Despite
numerous factual errors in the letter, the Court held that the First
Amendment protected the teacher’s speech unless he knew the statements
were false or exhibited a reckless disregard for the truth. The teacher’s
speech had touched on a matter of public concern and did not interfere with
his ability to do his job; thus, the First Amendment protected the letter’s
contents.41
Initially, courts granted increasingly broad First Amendment
protection to public employees.42 The Supreme Court extended this
protection to private conversations,43 and lower courts protected educators’
First Amendment rights to wear black armbands to protest the Vietnam
War,44 comment publicly on collective bargaining agreements,45 and
criticize school policies.46 The Court also designed a framework to analyze
causation in First Amendment retaliation cases.47 However, the Court soon
began to limit these protections. First, in Connick v. Meyers, it added
greater scrutiny and rigor to determining what qualifies as a matter of
38

See id. at 565–68.
Id. at 568; see also Johnson v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d 954, 961 (9th Cir. 2011)
(“However, the Supreme Court has held that where the government acts as both sovereign and
employer, this general forum-based analysis does not apply.”).
40
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570, 572–73 (footnote omitted).
41
See id. at 573–75.
42
See McCarthy & Eckes, supra note 29, at 211.
43
See Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415–16 (1979) (describing a teacher
who voiced concerns about racial discrimination in the school to her principal); see also Rankin v.
McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 392 (1987) (protecting a statement made during a private conversation).
44
See James v. Bd. of Educ., 461 F.2d 566, 572–76 (2d Cir. 1972).
45
See McGill v. Bd. of Educ., 602 F.2d 774, 778–79 (7th Cir. 1979).
46
See Lemons v. Morgan, 629 F.2d 1389, 1390–91 (8th Cir. 1980); Bernasconi v. Tempe
Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 3, 548 F.2d 857, 861–62 (9th Cir. 1977).
47
This framework was announced in Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) (discussing the First Amendment suit by a teacher who claimed he was
fired for publicly criticizing a dress code implemented by his school’s principal). First, the plaintiff was
required to show that his constitutionally protected conduct was a “motivating factor” in causing an
adverse employment action. Id. Then, the defendant would have the opportunity to show she would
have taken the same action absent the protected conduct. Id.
39
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public concern.48 The Court distinguished what it viewed as mere
“employee grievances” from true matters of public concern that touch on
issues “of political, social, or other concern of the community.”49
The Court implemented a more striking limitation on public employee
speech protection in Garcetti v. Ceballos.50 Richard Ceballos was a deputy
district attorney in Los Angeles County.51 During an investigation, he wrote
a memo to his supervisors criticizing the veracity of an affidavit underlying
a search warrant used to gather evidence in their case.52 The district
attorney’s office proceeded with the prosecution, and Ceballos alleged he
was subjected to retaliatory employment actions because he voiced concern
in the memo.53
In evaluating this claim, the Court applied and refined the Pickering
standard.54 In a five-to-four decision authored by Justice Kennedy, the
Court rejected Garcetti’s claim. Much as Connick did for the notion of a
“matter of public concern,” the Court further defined and emphasized the
“citizen” component of the Pickering standard: “[W]hen public employees
make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not
speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution
does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.”55
For educators, curricular speech is by its very definition pursuant to
their official duties—applying Garcetti to teachers would effectively
nullify their First Amendment protection. However, Justice Kennedy’s
opinion explicitly did not reach issues related to “academic freedom.”56
Because “classroom instruction implicates additional constitutional
interests that are not fully accounted for by this Court’s customary
employee-speech jurisprudence,” the Court declined to determine whether
this analysis would apply to scholarship or teaching.57
It is uncertain whether Justice Kennedy’s caveat was intended to apply
to educators in K–12 schools as opposed to only those in higher education.
The plain language of the opinion appears to exempt both “classroom
instruction” and “teaching” from the Garcetti analysis, leaving the door
48

461 U.S. 138, 140–42, 154 (1983) (holding that a district attorney who circulated a questionnaire
asking about office morale and supervisor competency was not entitled to First Amendment protection).
49
Id. at 146–47.
50
547 U.S. 410 (2006).
51
Id. at 413.
52
See id. at 413–14.
53
See id. at 414–15.
54
See id. at 417–21.
55
Id. at 421. The Court did state that “[t]he First Amendment protects some expressions related to
the speaker’s job” and “expressions made at work” in accord with Givhan. Id. at 420–21 (discussing
Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 414 (1979)). However, the exact nature of these
remaining protections was not defined.
56
Id. at 425.
57
Id.
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open for protection of K–12 educators’ curricular speech. However, the
relevant passage appears to respond to criticism leveled by Justice Souter in
dissent that argued the majority’s holding may “imperil First Amendment
protection of academic freedom in public colleges and universities.”58
Additionally, the concept of academic freedom has primarily been applied
to the university setting.59 This uncertainty has led to two different
applications of the public employee speech framework to curricular speech:
one embracing Kennedy’s caveat and applying pre-Garcetti standards
(Pickering) and the other applying Garcetti (Pickering–Garcetti) in full
force.
a. The Pickering approach.—Although Pickering itself involved
a teacher’s off-campus speech, several circuits have applied this test to
educators’ speech within the schoolhouse.60 At present, the Third,61
Fourth,62 and Fifth63 Circuits apply the Pickering framework without
Garcetti’s additional requirements.64 Before switching approaches in light
of Garcetti, the Sixth Circuit applied Pickering.65 These Sixth Circuit cases,
while no longer controlling, still provide insight into the application of the
Pickering standard.
Courts employing Pickering have further split on whether the First
Amendment protects curricular speech. These courts have differed on
whether controversial curricular speech can touch on a matter of public
58

Id. at 438 (Souter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
See infra Part I.B.
60
Some cases and articles have referred to this test, which applies pre-Garcetti public employee
speech law, as “Pickering–Connick.” See Cal. Teachers Ass’n v. State Bd. of Educ., 271 F.3d 1141,
1149 n.6 (9th Cir. 2001); Alexander Wohl, Oiling the Schoolhouse Gate: After Forty Years of Tinkering
with Teachers’ First Amendment Rights, Time for a New Beginning, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1285, 1302
(2009). In the interest of brevity, this Note will use Pickering to refer to pre-Garcetti doctrine and
Pickering–Garcetti to refer to current employee speech doctrine.
61
See Borden v. Sch. Dist. of Twp. of E. Brunswick, 523 F.3d 153, 168 (3d Cir. 2008).
62
See Lee v. York Cnty. Sch. Div., 484 F.3d 687, 694 n.11 (4th Cir. 2007); Boring v. Buncombe
Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 368–69 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
63
See Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 799 (5th Cir. 1989).
64
The exact impact of the Garcetti decision in this area is still evolving and uncertain. Two courts
have declined to reach the question of Garcetti’s application to curricular speech because the decision
itself was unclear on that point and the speech at issue would not be protected even under preexisting
standards. See Panse v. Eastwood, 303 F. App’x 933, 935 (2d Cir. 2008) (reasoning that because the
plaintiff’s claim would fail under Hazelwood, the court “need not resolve the issue of whether Garcetti
or some other standard applies here”); Borden, 523 F.3d at 171 n.13 (reasoning that because a coach’s
participation in a student-led prayer was not a matter of public concern under Pickering, the court need
not decide whether Garcetti applies in the educational context). The Fourth Circuit more explicitly
addressed the issue, stating: “The Court explicitly did not decide whether [Garcetti] would apply in the
same manner to a case involving speech related to teaching. Thus, we continue to apply the Pickering–
Connick standard . . . .” Lee, 484 F.3d at 694 n.11 (citation omitted). The Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth
Circuits view Garcetti as controlling, see infra Part I.A.1.b, while the First, Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits have not addressed the issue since Garcetti.
65
Evans-Marshall I, 428 F.3d 223, 228 (6th Cir. 2005).
59
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concern—some viewing it instead as an internal grievance—and if teachers
must be speaking as citizens in order to be protected.66 In Evans-Marshall
v. Board of Education of Tipp City Exempted Village School District
(Evans-Marshall I), the literary works being discussed—To Kill a
Mockingbird, Fahrenheit 451, and Siddhartha—explored numerous
culturally significant themes such as race, justice, gender, and power.67 The
court stated that these themes touched on matters of public concern and
noted that “the Supreme Court has never removed in-class speech from its
presumptive place within the ambit of the First Amendment.”68 Thus, the
analysis could proceed to the balancing of interests.69
However, other courts have reasoned that curricular speech is
inherently lacking expressive content, and thus unrelated to matters of
public concern. In Boring v. Buncombe County Board of Education,
Margaret Boring chose the play Independence, featuring controversial
issues including homosexuality, for students in her class to perform at a
competition.70 The court held that conflict resulting from the selection and
performance of the play did “not present a matter of public concern and is
nothing more than an ordinary employment dispute.”71 Instead of viewing
the play as expression in and of itself, the court reasoned that her speech
was about the choice of curriculum.
While the line between protected expression and unprotected
employment disputes rightly should be drawn, courts often fail to do so
correctly by ignoring the reasons for adverse employment actions. For
example, suppose a teacher decides to employ a book in her American
literature class. Her principal later punishes her because she assigned the
book. One can imagine reasons for the teacher’s firing that should not
implicate the First Amendment because they are not based on protected
expression. The teacher could have assigned The Great Gatsby when she
was required to teach Death of a Salesman. She could have failed to
consult the principal before selecting a new book in contradiction of school
policy. Both of these scenarios are rightly characterized as run-of-the-mill
employment disputes because the decisions were based on the teacher’s
insubordination rather than the content of the curricular speech. On the
other hand, if the firing were based on the teacher’s expression of the
book’s ideas, the principal would clearly be reacting to the content of that
66

See id. at 234–36 (Sutton, J., concurring); Kirkland, 890 F.2d at 799–800.
428 F.3d at 226–37.
68
Id. at 229. This holding was reversed after Garcetti. See Evans-Marshall II, 624 F.3d 332 (6th
Cir. 2010).
69
Evans-Marshall I, 428 F.3d at 231.
70
136 F.3d 364, 366–68 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc). Boring was transferred against her wishes for
her choice of the play despite “compl[ying] with the school administration’s requirements and policies
in every respect.” Id. at 375–76 (Motz, J., dissenting).
71
Id. at 368 (majority opinion).
67
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speech. In that situation, the courts should determine whether that content
touches on a matter of public concern. However, some courts, like that in
Boring, appear to stop short of looking at the principal’s motivation,
instead viewing any dispute over curriculum as per se devoid of expressive
content.
Additionally, the circuits have differed on the importance of speaking
as a “citizen” to the Pickering balance. The Sixth Circuit reasoned that as
long as speech related to a matter of public concern, it was insignificant
whether the teacher was speaking as a public employee or private citizen.72
The Fifth Circuit held differently, denying First Amendment protection to
the content of a reading list used by a high school history teacher. The court
stated that the teacher “did not speak out as a citizen when he offered a
separate body of material.”73
While theoretically applying the same test, these courts have taken
fundamentally different approaches to defining the protection of curricular
speech. Two main factors divide these circuits. First, they differ on what it
means to speak as a citizen on a matter of public concern; while the Sixth
Circuit views the “matter of public concern” language as determinative, the
Fourth and Fifth Circuits also require the teacher to be speaking as a
citizen. Second, they differ in how to characterize curricular decisions. A
curricular decision can be viewed as expression, the substance of which can
touch on a matter of public concern, or solely as a workplace decision
divorced from its content. This characterization is important: conflict over
the former implicates free speech protection while the latter, simply the
ability to make a choice at work, does not trigger constitutional protections.
While courts employing Pickering have been inconsistent in its application,
unlike Pickering–Garcetti, it still theoretically protects curricular speech.
Seventh,

b.

75

72

Pickering–Garcetti.—In the years since Garcetti, the Sixth,74
and Ninth76 Circuits have adopted the Pickering–Garcetti

See Cockrel v. Shelby Cnty. Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1051–53 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he key
question is not whether a person is speaking in his role as an employee or a citizen, but whether the
employee’s speech in fact touches on matters of public concern.”). This case involved a fifth grade
teacher in Kentucky who hosted a presentation by Woody Harrelson, in conjunction with a CNN
special, in her classroom to discuss industrial hemp. See id. at 1041–43. Despite obtaining prior
permission from her principal, the teacher was fired after a number of community members complained
about the presentation. See id. at 1045. The court ultimately found that her speech was protected by the
First Amendment. See id. at 1055.
73
Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 800 (5th Cir. 1989).
74
See Evans-Marshall II, 624 F.3d 332, 341 (6th Cir. 2010).
75
See Mayer v. Monroe Cnty. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477, 478–80 (7th Cir. 2007). This court
differentiated the speech of post-secondary educators and those in primary and secondary education,
stating “[h]ow much room is left for constitutional protection of scholarly viewpoints in post-secondary
education was left open in Garcetti and Piggee and need not be resolved today.” Id. at 480; see also
Piggee v. Carl Sandburg Coll., 464 F.3d 667, 670–72 (7th Cir. 2006) (stating the Garcetti decision did
not apply to a post-secondary teacher’s claim).
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approach. The Seventh Circuit’s analysis of curricular speech issues has
seen the greatest impact from Garcetti, as the court previously applied the
Hazelwood student speech standard.77
Pickering–Garcetti likely affords no protection for curricular speech.
Garcetti placed all speech made by public employees pursuant to their
official duties outside the protection of the First Amendment. As
implementing a curriculum is the primary job of a teacher, curricular
speech is per se made pursuant to a teacher’s official duties and thus lacks
protection against retaliation. Courts may, as they have in other contexts,
try to circumvent Garcetti by so narrowly defining employees’ official
duties that their conduct is not technically pursuant to their employment.78
For instance, a math teacher’s role may be to deliver a board-approved
algebra curriculum. Accordingly, commenting on current events would not
be pursuant to his official duties—current events generally have little to do
with mathematics instruction. This sort of maneuver seems unlikely in the
area of curricular speech where delivering instruction to a class is the
quintessential duty of a teacher.79 It would also lead to paradoxical results;
a current events teacher discussing a political controversy would not be
protected while a science teacher could be.
The public employee speech analysis found in the Pickering line of
precedent has become the most common test among federal circuit courts.
However, a number of circuits have also used the student speech
framework to evaluate curricular speech claims.
2. Student Speech: The Hazelwood Standard.—While the Hazelwood
standard was initially developed to determine the free speech rights of
students within schools, several circuits have also applied it to teachers’
classroom speech. Generally, this test allows restriction of curricular
speech for legitimate pedagogical reasons. The First,80 Second,81 Eighth,82
76

See Johnson v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d 954, 966 & n.12 (9th Cir. 2011).
Compare Mayer, 474 F.3d at 477–80 (applying Pickering–Garcetti), with Webster v. New
Lennox Sch. Dist. No. 122, 917 F.2d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 1990) (applying Hazelwood).
78
See, e.g., Reinhardt v. Albuquerque Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 595 F.3d 1126, 1130–37 (10th Cir.
2010). The court held that a speech pathologist was not acting pursuant to her official duties in
reporting to the state that she was not being given an accurate list of students needing services. See id. at
1135–37. The court reasoned that reporting violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA) to the state department of education was not pursuant to her official duties because she was not
hired as an IDEA compliance officer and the reporting happened outside of her normal chain of
command. See id.
79
The Ninth Circuit soundly rejected this sort of argument where a math teacher posted banners in
his classroom that took historical texts out of context to promote a religious message. See Johnson, 658
F.3d at 954, 968 (“Rather, because of the position of trust and authority they hold and the
impressionable young minds with which they interact, teachers necessarily act as teachers for purposes
of a Pickering inquiry when at school or a school function, in the general presence of students, in a
capacity one might reasonably view as official.”).
80
See Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 452 (1st Cir. 1993).
77
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and Tenth83 Circuits use this standard.84 Additionally, the Seventh85 and
Ninth86 Circuits had employed this test before Garcetti.
The Supreme Court first protected students’ free speech rights in
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District.87 In Tinker,
the Court held that the First Amendment shielded the right of students to
wear armbands to protest the Vietnam War, stating: “It can hardly be
argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”88
The Court elaborated on students’ rights within the schoolhouse in
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.89 Unlike the very personal
expression found in Tinker, the student speech at issue in Hazelwood
appeared in a school newspaper.90 The school’s principal removed an
article focusing on teen pregnancy from the paper before publication. In
holding that the article lacked First Amendment protection, the Court
reasoned that the newspaper was not a public forum.91 Thus, the school
officials retained the power to control speech that “the public might
reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school[,] . . . so long as
their actions [were] reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns.”92
Reasoning that teachers’ curricular speech also bears the “imprimatur
of the school,” a number of circuits have applied Hazelwood’s legitimate

81

See Silano v. Sag Harbor Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 42 F.3d 719, 722–23 (2d Cir.

1994).
82

See Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized Sch. Dist., 147 F.3d 718, 724 (8th Cir. 1998).
See Miles v. Denver Pub. Sch., 944 F.2d 773, 775–79 (10th Cir. 1991).
84
It should again be noted that the First, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have not addressed curricular
speech in light of Garcetti. The Seventh Circuit’s move from Hazelwood to Pickering–Garcetti in
Mayer, written by Chief Judge Frank Easterbrook, highlights the possibility that other courts may do the
same. See Mayer v. Monroe Cnty. Cmty Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477 (7th Cir. 2007).
85
See Webster v. New Lennox Sch. Dist. No. 122, 917 F.2d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 1990).
86
See Cal. Teachers Ass’n v. State Bd. of Educ., 271 F.3d 1141, 1148–49 (9th Cir. 2001).
87
393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
88
Id. While the facts of Tinker limit its holding to the rights of students, the Court used broad
language in describing the First Amendment protections for both students and teachers within the
school setting. See id. (“First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the
school environment, are available to teachers and students.”).
89
484 U.S. 260 (1988).
90
See id. at 262–64.
91
See id. at 267–70. The court also mentioned in dicta that “public schools do not possess all of the
attributes of streets, parks, and other traditional public forums that ‘time out of mind, have been used
for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.’”
Id. at 267 (quoting Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (plurality opinion)). This Note proceeds on
the assumption that the classroom during instruction time is not a public forum and thus is subject to
reasonable, viewpoint-neutral restrictions on speech.
92
Id. at 271, 273.
83
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pedagogical concern test to teachers’ curricular speech.93 In applying
Hazelwood, courts have upheld restrictions on educators discussing school
gossip,94 allowing students to use profanity in class projects,95 and showing
videos containing nudity.96
The First Circuit developed the most comprehensive approach to
teachers’ speech under Hazelwood. In Ward v. Hickey, the court analogized
the classroom setting to the school newspaper in Hazelwood; neither are
public forums, and therefore the school can reasonably restrict speech.97
Additionally, both a teacher’s instructional speech and a student newspaper
are part of the curriculum.98
Having tied the analysis of teachers’ curricular speech into
Hazelwood’s reasoning, the First Circuit applied a two-part test based on
the Supreme Court’s holding. The school “may regulate a teacher’s
classroom speech if: (1) the regulation is reasonably related to a legitimate
pedagogical concern; and (2) the school provided the teacher with notice of
what conduct was prohibited.”99 The court elaborated on the first element,
taken expressly from Hazelwood, by articulating factors to guide what
pedagogical concerns are reasonable, including the “age and sophistication
of the students, the relationship between teaching method and valid
educational objective, and the context and manner of the presentation.”100
The notice prong of this test was inferred from Hazelwood and is
unique to the First Circuit.101 Hazelwood’s statement that prepublication
control of a school newspaper’s content need not be pursuant to express
regulation “suggests that the Court would agree that postpublication
retaliation must derive from some prior limitation.”102 In determining
whether a teacher is on notice, the court examined whether, based on prior
communications, it was “reasonable for the school to expect the teacher to
know that her conduct was prohibited.”103 This standard does not require an
93

See Miles v. Denver Pub. Sch., 944 F.2d 773, 776 (10th Cir. 1991) (“We are convinced that if
students’ expression in a school newspaper bears the imprimatur of the school, then a teacher’s
expression in the ‘traditional classroom setting’ also bears the imprimatur of the school.” (quoting
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271)).
94
See id. at 774, 779 (describing a teacher commenting to his class about a rumor that two students
had been caught “making out on the tennis court”).
95
See Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized Sch. Dist., 147 F.3d 718, 719 (8th Cir. 1998).
96
See Silano v. Sag Harbor Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 42 F.3d 719, 721, 723 (2d Cir.
1994) (describing a guest speaker in a mathematics class using a video featuring a topless woman to
demonstrate the phenomenon of “persistence of vision”).
97
996 F.2d 448, 453 (1st Cir. 1993).
98
Id.
99
Id. at 452 (citations omitted).
100
Id. at 453. These factors to determine legitimate pedagogical interests have also been adopted
by the Second Circuit. See Silano, 42 F.3d at 722–23.
101
See Daly, supra note 26, at 22–23.
102
Ward, 996 F.2d at 453.
103
Id. at 454.
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explicit prohibition of “every imaginable inappropriate conduct by
teachers,” only that they would reasonably know their conduct was
inappropriate.104
While the First Circuit’s test, particularly the notice requirement, does
provide some protection for teachers, other courts have been less rigorous
in applying Hazelwood. Often, these courts fail to define what constitutes a
legitimate pedagogical concern and instead merely defer to school
administrators.105 Despite these issues, the Hazelwood test still offers
greater potential protection than afforded by courts applying Rust.
3. Government as Speaker: The Rust Approach.—In a far less
common and more tenuous approach, some courts have imported the First
Amendment analysis in Rust v. Sullivan and its progeny into the context of
curricular speech.106 Under this approach, the government subsidizes
teachers’ curricular speech in order to convey a particular message;
teachers in the classroom are essentially paid to speak on behalf of the
government. Thus, governmental entities (like school boards) can define
the scope of a teacher’s speech without violating the First Amendment—
they are simply choosing what speech to subsidize and preventing their
message from being distorted.107 While not explicitly adopting Rust as
controlling precedent, this general approach has influenced decisions in the
Third108 and Ninth109 Circuits.110 However, the most recent decisions in
these circuits have employed the Pickering test.111
104

Id.
See Daly, supra note 26, at 13.
106
500 U.S. 173 (1991). In many ways, this Note uses Rust as shorthand for a general approach
that is better developed in theory than in practice. It has been suggested that Rust be explicitly adopted
in all curricular speech cases. See Emily White Kirsch, Note, First Amendment Protection of Teachers’
Instructional Speech: Extending Rust v. Sullivan to Ensure that Teachers Do Not Distort the
Government Message, 58 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 185, 187 (2010).
107
See Cal. Teachers Ass’n v. State Bd. of Educ., 271 F.3d 1141, 1149 n.6 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Under
Rust–Rosenberger, when the government is the speaker, in the sense that the government is conveying a
particular message through a person, that person receives no First Amendment protection.”).
108
See Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 910 F.2d 1172, 1176 (3d Cir. 1990).
109
See Downs v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 1013 (9th Cir. 2000).
110
These cases employ the general idea that curricular speech is government speech and thus the
government can regulate it as it sees fit. Neither case explicitly states that Rust is controlling—the Third
Circuit decision in Bradley actually predates Rust.
111
See Johnson v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d 954, 960–61 (9th Cir. 2011); Borden v. Sch.
Dist. of the Twp. of E. Brunswick, 523 F.3d 153, 168–69 (3d Cir. 2008). Johnson discussed this line of
cases as informative in applying Pickering. Johnson, 658 F.3d at 957 (“[A teacher] speaks not as an
individual, but as a public employee, and the school district is free to ‘take legitimate and appropriate
steps to ensure that its message is neither garbled nor distorted.’” (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector &
Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995))). Indeed, the court categorically distinguished
between speech of a private individual that could reasonably bear the imprimatur of the school (citing
Lee v. York Cnty. Sch. Div., 484 F.3d 687, 697 (4th Cir. 2007), as standing for the “curricular speech
doctrine”) and the state’s ability to speak through “the mouthpiece of one of its employees” (citing
105
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The seminal case in this line is Rust v. Sullivan.112 In Rust, private
healthcare providers initiated a First Amendment challenge to a federal
regulation that banned funding of family planning services that offered
abortion counseling.113 In finding that the regulations did not violate the
free speech rights of healthcare workers, the Court reasoned that Congress
can define the scope of a discretionary government program as it sees fit;
“the Government may choose not to subsidize speech.”114 This reasoning
was stated even more directly in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of
University of Virginia.115 When funding a project, the government “may
take legitimate and appropriate steps to ensure that its message is neither
garbled nor distorted.”116 As a logical extension of this reasoning, “when
the State is the speaker, it may make content-based choices.”117
As the government funds public schools and pays teachers’ salaries,
courts have reasoned that the government may dictate the speech of
educators without violating the First Amendment. In a decision citing both
Rust and Rosenberger, the court in Downs v. Los Angeles Unified School
District rejected protection for curricular speech.118 The court reasoned that
because a teacher’s choice to put articles on a bulletin board was a
“manifestation of the school board’s policy,” the teacher was speaking as
the government.119 Thus, the speech “is not subject to the constraints of
constitutional safeguards and forum analysis, but instead is measured by
practical considerations applicable to any individual’s choice of how to
Downs, 228 F.3d at 1012). Id. at 966 n.11. While the former is subject to scrutiny for viewpoint
neutrality, the latter is not. See id.
112
500 U.S. 173 (1991).
113
See id. at 177–82. This case involved a requirement in Title X of the Public Health Services Act
that authorized funding family planning services—often carried out through contracts with private
groups—pursuant to regulations. See id. at 178–81. The Act also specified that Title X funds should be
used only for preventative family planning. Id. A subsequent regulation made clear that groups
receiving funding could not counsel mothers to get abortions. Id.
114
Id. at 177–82, 193, 200 (“The Government can, without violating the Constitution, selectively
fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public interest, without at the same
time funding an alternative program which seeks to deal with the problem in another way. In so doing,
the Government has not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it has merely chosen to fund one
activity to the exclusion of the other.”).
115
515 U.S. at 833–34 (discussing Rust in a suit challenging university guidelines prohibiting the
use of student funds for religious groups). The Rust decision itself did not explicitly state that family
planning service providers were speaking for the government. This extension was based on other cases
that are connected with Rust by the courts. See Edwards v. Cal. Univ. of Pa., 156 F.3d 488, 491 (3d Cir.
1998).
116
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833.
117
Id.
118
228 F.3d 1003, 1005, 1013 (9th Cir. 2000).
119
Id. at 1012–13. In response to a school diversity initiative supporting gay and lesbian students,
the teacher put together a bulletin board intended to promote the traditional family, stating sixty percent
of Americans viewed homosexuality as immoral and quoting a passage from Leviticus that refers to
homosexual relations as “detestable.” Id. at 1006–08.
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convey oneself: among other things, content, timing, and purpose.”120 Only
when the people have elected an individual does that individual have a
right to speak as the government.121 This type of reasoning has also been
applied to higher education122 and bears a striking resemblance to the
reasoning of courts applying Garcetti to curricular speech.123
4. Problems with Existing Doctrine.—While protecting curricular
speech could be achieved without any change to existing Supreme Court
precedent, the standards used by the circuit courts are fundamentally
flawed. The Pickering standard simply does not provide significant
protection for teachers.124 Whether or not Garcetti’s holding applies to
teaching, the standard on its face states that employees receive protection
only when speaking as citizens. While this could protect a teacher making
an offhand remark during a lesson, it would be inconsistent to protect that
remark while not protecting the thoughtfully assembled content of her
lesson plans. How a teacher would indicate that she is speaking as a private
citizen or teacher when in front of a classroom is also unclear.
Pickering’s requirement of content about a public concern is similarly
problematic. Courts have struggled to apply this test to educators.
Expression that clearly implicates matters of political or social importance
has been found to not touch on a matter of public concern.125 Second, the
premise that all speech on matters of public concern should be protected in
schools deserves questioning. Should a middle school math teacher be
protected in taking time away from teaching algebra to devote a class to
expressing his view on who should be the next President? The classroom
provides a teacher with a captive audience for the purpose of carrying out
specific educational goals—a teacher should not be allowed to abuse that
power on a whim. Also, the facts of Pickering show that speech on a matter
of public concern can be protected even if entirely inaccurate.126 Educators
120

Id. at 1013.
See id. at 1016.
122
See Edwards v. Cal. Univ. of Pa., 156 F.3d 488, 491 (3d Cir. 1998) (“Our conclusion that the
First Amendment does not place restrictions on a public university’s ability to control its curriculum is
consistent with the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence concerning the state’s ability to say what it wishes
when it is the speaker.”).
123
See Mayer v. Monroe Cnty. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477, 479 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he school
system does not ‘regulate’ teachers’ speech as much as it hires that speech.”).
124
For a discussion of why this speech should be protected, see infra Part II.
125
See Boring v. Buncombe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 368 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc)
(holding that the choice to present a play dealing with homosexuality and single-parent families did not
touch on a matter of public concern despite the clear social relevance of the issues—the court focused
on the choice of curriculum in the abstract, instead of the specific characteristics of the play selected).
126
See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 582 (1968) (White, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“The Court holds that truthful statements by a school teacher critical of the school
board are within the ambit of the First Amendment. So also are false statements innocently or
negligently made.”).
121
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should not be allowed to mislead their students in the name of the First
Amendment—such speech then goes to their competence, which is an
appropriate basis for dismissal.
The use of the Hazelwood standard also has problems in theory and
application. Many of these issues stem from Hazelwood’s original purpose:
analyzing the ability of schools to restrain student speech. While its origins
do not make the Hazelwood analysis inherently inapplicable to teachers,
several problems emerge in equating student and teacher classroom speech.
Unlike students, teachers are professional pedagogues. And like the school
administration in Hazelwood, teachers have legitimate pedagogical
interests in the happenings of their classrooms. The Hazelwood Court did
state that school officials may impose reasonable speech restrictions on
students and teachers. However, it does not follow that an identical
restriction would be reasonable for both, as the Court recognized that
teachers have a distinct responsibility to educate young people.127
Additionally, this test only assesses the concerns of the censor of speech,
entirely ignoring the targets of censorship and their expression. Thus,
Hazelwood provides no enclave of First Amendment protection when a
teacher and administration have legitimate pedagogical differences.
Likewise, courts have not been particularly rigorous in applying the
“legitimate pedagogical concern” test to teacher speech. Many courts
simply defer to the school administration or board in determining what is
legitimate instead of actually analyzing whether the pedagogical concern
truly supports the limitation on speech.128 This deference is understandable
because judges are not required to be well versed in pedagogy; determining
what is a legitimate pedagogical concern is outside their general
competence. The test is also vague, providing no guidance as to what
concerns are truly legitimate.129
In addition to providing no protection for curricular speech, the Rust
government speech approach fundamentally misunderstands the basic
operational realities of public schools. Rust is concerned with the
government’s ability to control the precise message of speech it subsidizes
to prevent distortion. However, the government generally does not
127

See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (“This standard is consistent
with our oft-expressed view that the education of the Nation’s youth is primarily the responsibility of
parents, teachers, and state and local school officials . . . .”).
128
Many cases in the circuit courts have no significant discussion of whether the actions of the
school board were the result of legitimate pedagogical concerns. See, e.g., Silano v. Sag Harbor Union
Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 42 F.3d 719, 723 (2d Cir. 1994) (reasoning that a teacher’s use of a video
was not protected because it was “unnecessary”).
129
See Boring, 136 F.3d at 371–72 (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring) (“The dissenters [advocating
adoption of the Hazelwood test] seize upon one loose, slippery, litigious phrase—‘legitimate
pedagogical concern’—and consign it to the mercies of the federal courts. They provide not one iota of
guidance to local school administrators on the interpretation of this tantalizing formulation, nor could
they.”).
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prescribe specific speech to educators. Most teachers are not provided with
a script to follow in their classrooms. Instead, they receive their assigned
curriculum, often in the form of a document, which guides their
individualized instruction. These documents can vary widely from
prescribing instruction on very specific content and concepts to more
general topics to be covered.130 Often, such documents do not even suggest
what materials would be helpful in engaging students on that topic.
Teachers take the general topic or concept to be illustrated and create a
lesson by independently drawing from a variety of resources.
For example, suppose a teacher’s curriculum directs him to teach the
causes of the French Revolution. An instructor may create a lesson that
employs video clips, political cartoons depicting the three estates, and a
dramatic reading from the writings of Robespierre. None of this curricular
speech was dictated by the government. Rather, this process of developing
daily lessons and selecting materials for the classrooms bears greater
resemblance to a delegation of authority than to a prescription of conduct.
Thus, Rust does not afford teachers the necessary latitude to implement
their curriculum within the parameters of the authority they have been
delegated.
B. Academic Freedom: A Right to Teach
In addition to free speech approaches, the concept of academic
freedom is another potential source of protection for teachers’ curricular
speech. In this context, academic freedom would protect the discretion of
teachers, as professional educators, to run their classrooms as they see fit.131
The Supreme Court first endorsed the doctrine of academic freedom in
Sweezy v. New Hampshire.132 The Court found that a professor’s contempt
conviction for refusing to answer questions pertaining to alleged subversive
activities and academic lectures violated the professor’s constitutional
rights.133 Academic freedom was considered vital for the development of

130

For an illustration of typical curriculum documents, see Model Curriculum: English Language
Arts (K–12), NEW JERSEY DEPT. OF EDUC., http://www.state.nj.us/education/modelcurriculum/ela/ (last
visited June 2, 2013).
131
See Donald F. Uerling, Academic Freedom in K–12 Education, 79 NEB. L. REV. 956, 956
(2000) (defining academic freedom in K–12 education as “First Amendment protections of professional
discretion that a public school teacher may exercise in the course of performing his or her teaching
functions”).
132
354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (plurality opinion). Concurring and dissenting opinions had
previously discussed notions of academic freedom. See Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 194–96
(1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (stating “unwarranted inhibition upon the free spirit of teachers . . .
has an unmistakable tendency to chill that free play of the spirit which all teachers ought especially to
cultivate and practice” and calling teachers “the priests of our democracy”); Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342
U.S. 485, 508–11 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
133
See Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 235–45 (plurality opinion).
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American society.134 In a concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter specified
four essential academic freedoms for a university: “who may teach, what
may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to
study.”135 The Court in Keyishian reaffirmed this doctrine by calling it a
“special concern of the First Amendment.”136
While not directly applying the academic freedom doctrine to primary
and secondary classrooms, courts have used the rhetoric of academic
freedom in discussing cases involving secondary school teachers.137 The
First Circuit twice protected the expression of high school English teachers
discussing vulgar language during lessons on academic freedom grounds.138
But other circuits resisted the application of academic freedom in the
content of classroom lessons.139
Academic freedom protections are tenuous when imported from the
university setting into primary and secondary schools. First, the doctrine
itself is not well-defined or broadly applied even at the university level; the
development of the academic freedom doctrine has arisen primarily from
cases involving loyalty oaths for individual professors at public universities

134

See id. at 250 (“The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities is
almost self-evident. . . . Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to
evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.”).
135
Id. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting CONFERENCE OF
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNIV. OF CAPE TOWN AND THE UNIV. OF THE WITWATERSRAND,
JOHANNESBURG, THE OPEN UNIVERSITIES OF SOUTH AFRICA 10–12 (1957)).
136
Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). The opinion in Sweezy discussed the
First Amendment, but ultimately decided the case on the grounds of Fourteenth Amendment due
process protection. See Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 235, 255 (plurality opinion).
137
The Supreme Court in Epperson v. Arkansas noted that the nation’s courts “have not failed to
apply the First Amendment’s mandate in our educational system where essential to safeguard the
fundamental values of freedom of speech and inquiry and of belief” and reasserted that courts should
not tolerate “a pall of orthodoxy” in American classrooms. 393 U.S. 97, 104–05, 109 (1968) (quoting
Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603) (holding that a state statute that criminalized teaching evolution in public
schools violated the Establishment Clause).
138
See Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359, 361 (1st Cir. 1969) (protecting the discussion of “a
vulgar term for an incestuous son” as used in an article in the Atlantic Monthly); Mailloux v. Kiley, 323
F. Supp. 1387, 1388 (D. Mass.), aff’d per curiam, 448 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir. 1971) (protecting a teacher
who wrote a vulgar word on the board in her classroom as part of a discussion of taboo words).
139
See Cary v. Bd. of Educ., 598 F.2d 535, 543 (10th Cir. 1979) (“Undoubtedly [teachers] have
some freedom in the techniques to be employed, but this does not say that they have an unlimited
liberty as to structure and content of the courses, at least at the secondary level.” (quoting Adams v.
Campbell Cnty. Sch. Dist., 511 F.2d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 1975))); see also Kirkland v. Northside
Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 800 (5th Cir. 1989) (“Although the concept of academic freedom has
been recognized in our jurisprudence, the doctrine has never conferred upon teachers the control of
public school curricula.” (footnote omitted)). These cases noted that academic freedom protections had
primarily been applied to the university setting and even there had not been applied to “curricular
decisions” and “teaching related speech.” See id.; Cary, 598 F.2d at 539–40.
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or institutional protections for the university itself.140 Additionally, the
Court has not explained precisely how academic freedom and public
employee speech analyses overlap.141 The cases applying academic freedom
doctrine to secondary schools are limited to a small period of the 1960s and
early 1970s, well before the Court’s decision in Hazelwood; it appears that
analysis of curricular decisions was subsumed by free speech analysis.142
It is also uncertain if the rationale behind broadly defined academic
freedom is applicable in compulsory primary and secondary education.
University students are generally adults who have chosen to be in a
particular course of study at a particular university. University professors
are charged with developing new and creative ideas that add to human
understanding. This mission is different from that of a primary or
secondary school teacher whose job focuses far more on the development
of skills and core knowledge. Broad protections meant to promote the
development of new and bold ideas are not necessary for primary and
secondary schools to carry out their purpose.
C. A Student’s Right to Hear
While even more tenuous than academic freedom, another potential
source of First Amendment protections for teachers is a student’s right to
be exposed to diverse ideas and avoid indoctrination by teachers.143 This
right to hear is derived from language in Tinker, stating that schools could
not create “enclaves of totalitarianism” nor regard students “as closedcircuit recipients of only that which the State chooses to communicate.”144
This right was more explicitly stated in the plurality opinion in Board of
Education v. Pico.145 The plurality acknowledged a right to receive ideas
140

Anne Gardner, Note, Preparing Students for Democratic Participation: Why Teacher
Curricular Speech Should Sometimes Be Protected by the First Amendment, 73 MO. L. REV. 213, 227
(2008).
141
Id. at 227–28. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke relied on academic freedom
protections to support its conclusion that the state had a compelling interest in the freedom of the
university to decide the composition of its student body. See 438 U.S. 265, 311–12 (1978) (Powell, J.).
142
The First Circuit in Ward cited the circuit’s previous academic freedom decisions, see supra
note 138 and accompanying text, for the proposition that “postpublication retaliation must derive from
some prior limitation. . . . [T]his circuit has long recognized a teacher’s right to notice of what
classroom conduct is prohibited.” Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 453 (1st Cir. 1993). Additionally, one
of these cases was cited as providing the factors used to determine the propriety of a school’s regulation
of teacher speech. Id. at 452 (citing Mailloux v. Kiley, 448 F.2d 1242, 1243 (1st Cir. 1971) (per
curiam)). Thus, the First Circuit appears to have incorporated ideas of academic freedom into its free
speech determination, suggesting that academic freedom per se is no longer the source of protection.
143
See Daly, supra note 26, at 31 (“Students’ right to hear rests on a relatively uncertain judicial
foundation.”).
144
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
145
457 U.S. 853 (1982) (plurality opinion). This case involved students suing the local school
board after the board voted to remove a number of books, including Kurt Vonnegut’s SlaughterhouseFive, from the school library. See id. at 856–58 & n.3.

1938

107:1917 (2013)

Cracking Open the Classroom Door

that “follows ineluctably from the sender’s First Amendment right to send
them,”146 and found that a school board could not simply remove books
from a library because of partisan concerns.147
Ironically, this decision actually muddied the overall protection of
students’ rights while upholding them in the case before the Court. First,
the holding was incredibly narrow, specifically stating it applied to the
unique environment of the school library, not the classroom.148 The holding
also only applied to books already in a school library, leading then-Justice
Rehnquist to refer to the majority’s holding as enunciating “a curious
entitlement” that “exists only in the library of the school, and only if the
idea previously has been acquired by the school in book form.”149
Using a student’s right to hear to protect curricular speech requires
significant logical acrobatics. First, the right of a teacher to speak on
controversial topics would have to be recognized as a corollary of a
student’s right to hear about those topics. However, the Court stated a
student’s right to hear flowed from the speaker’s initial right to speak. This
logic results in a catch-22 in which a teacher’s freedom of expression is
contingent on a student’s right to hear, which is in turn derived from a
teacher’s right to speak. Additionally, the Court in Pico specifically applied
this protection only to the library, not to the classroom.
Given the multiplicity of underdeveloped and inconsistently applied
First Amendment approaches to curricular speech protection discussed in
this Part, a new standard is needed. While Garcetti left open the possibility
of providing First Amendment protection for curricular speech, neither
Garcetti nor any other Supreme Court decision has directly addressed the
nature of that protection. Thus, Part II seeks to summarize the theoretical
and practical concerns that inform the development of this new doctrine.
II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND PRAGMATIC CONCERNS
Universal public education in America has been both a linchpin of
economic and political success as well as a crucible for debates on societal
values.150 As a result, there are many competing concerns that attach to
146

Id. at 866–67 (reasoning “we have recognized that ‘the state may not, consistently with the
spirit of the First Amendment, contract the spectrum of available knowledge’” (quoting Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965))).
147
See id. at 870–71.
148
See id. at 868. This distinction seems to be at odds with the overall reasoning of the case. If a
right exists to hear about certain topics through the books purchased with the school board’s approval
for a library, it seems to follow that a teacher may receive some protection in telling the student about
that same topic in a class. Otherwise, a teacher could by punished for simply reading aloud from a book
found in a school’s own collection.
149
Id. at 910 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
150
See, e.g., Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205 (1963) (relating to the broader
discussion of separation of church and state in holding school-sponsored Bible reading
unconstitutional); President John F. Kennedy, State of the Union Address (Jan. 14, 1963), available at
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First Amendment rights in public schools. Starting with first principles, the
Court has been clear that teachers have constitutional protections within the
school151 and that schools should not be used to indoctrinate students;152
“[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion.”153 Failing to provide any
First Amendment protection to curricular speech would allow local schools
to dictate the opinions that can be shared in their classrooms with relative
impunity.
While the Court has stated that teachers do not “shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
gate,”154 the exact contours of those rights have not been defined. The Court
has articulated varying, often divergent interests concerning America’s
public schools: (1) the need to preserve a marketplace of ideas and prepare
students for participation in democratic government,155 (2) the need to
socialize students and help them develop economically useful skills,156 and
(3) the broad authority of local entities in determining appropriate
curriculum and managing their employees.157 Additionally, there are always
archetypically problematic teachers that courts have rightly feared will
abuse the captive audiences in their classrooms.158 A standard properly
defining First Amendment protections for curricular speech must balance
these competing interests and concerns.
A. The School as a Marketplace of Ideas
An active, thriving democracy requires citizens to be exposed to
diverse perspectives and to be able to think critically. America’s public
schools play an important role in this preparation, and have been thought to
do so since the Founding.159 The importance of creating a marketplace of

http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKPOF-042-021.aspx (“The future of any country
which is dependent upon the will and wisdom of its citizens is damaged, and irreparably damaged,
whenever any of its children is not educated to the full extent of his capacity, from grade school through
graduate school.”); President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 25, 2012), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/01/24/remarks-president-state-union-address (“But to
prepare for the jobs of tomorrow, our commitment to skills and education has to start earlier.”).
151
See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
152
See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 640–41 (1943).
153
Id. at 642.
154
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
155
See infra Part II.A.
156
See infra Part II.B.
157
See infra Part II.C.
158
See infra Part II.D.
159
See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Charles Jarvis (Sept. 28, 1820), in 10 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 161 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1899) (“I know no safe depository of
the ultimate powers of the society but the people themselves; and if we think them not enlightened
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ideas in American schools finds support in American history and
jurisprudence. Thomas Jefferson viewed public education as necessary to
create freethinking citizens.160 Likewise, Benjamin Franklin advocated the
discussion of “current controversies” in schools,161 and George Washington
viewed the dissemination of knowledge as vital for Americans “to discern
and provide against invasions of [their rights]; to distinguish between
oppression and the necessary exercise of lawful authority.”162
The Court has also latched onto the vision of the school as a
marketplace of ideas: “The Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained
through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers
truth ‘out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of
authoritative selection.’”163 Justice Frankfurter noted that democracy is able
to thrive “only if habits of open-mindedness and of critical inquiry are
acquired in the formative years of our citizens.”164 The Court recognized
that teachers need “wide discretion” to inspire students and inform their
views on government, politics, and social issues.165
This unique role of public education and public school teachers in a
democracy differentiates curricular speech from a teacher’s expression in a
enough to exercise their control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take it from them,
but to inform their discretion by education.”).
160
See Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, in THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 185, 265–66 (Adrienne Koch & William Peden eds., 1944).
161
Richard Rothstein & Rebecca Jacobsen, The Goals of Education, 88 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 264,
267 (2006).
162
President George Washington, First Annual Message to Congress (Jan. 8, 1790), in JARED
SPARKS & GEORGE WASHINGTON, 12 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 10 (1837).
163
Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (quoting United States v. Associated
Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)) (“The classroom is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of
ideas.’”); see also Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 402 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (opinion of Elrod,
J.) (“The habits and manners of a free people include tolerance and consideration of a range of political
and religious views.”).
164
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 196 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); accord Bethel
Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (“The role and purpose of the American public
school system were well described by two historians, who stated: ‘[P]ublic education must prepare
pupils for citizenship in the Republic. . . . It must inculcate the habits and manners of civility as values
in themselves conducive to happiness and as indispensable to the practice of self-government in the
community and the nation.’” (quoting CHARLES A. BEARD & MARY R. BEARD, THE BEARDS’ NEW
BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 228 (William Beard ed., rev. ed. 1968))).
165
Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 78–79 (1979) (“Within the public school system, teachers
play a critical part in developing students’ attitude toward government . . . . Alone among employees of
the system, teachers are in direct, day-to-day contact with students both in the classrooms and in the
other varied activities of a modern school. In shaping the students’ experience to achieve educational
goals, teachers by necessity have wide discretion over the way the course material is communicated to
students. They are responsible for presenting and explaining the subject matter in a way that is both
comprehensible and inspiring. . . . Thus, through both the presentation of course materials and the
example he sets, a teacher has an opportunity to influence the attitudes of students toward government,
the political process, and a citizen’s social responsibilities. This influence is crucial to the continued
good health of a democracy.”).
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staff meeting or a local bureaucrat’s discussion of her supervisor.166
Without an enclave of First Amendment protection against majoritarian
pressures, local entities could “cast a pall of orthodoxy over the
classroom.”167
B. The Socializing Function of Education
Despite the importance of exposing students to diverse perspectives,
legitimate countervailing interests suggest that curricular speech protection
should not be absolute. The Court has recognized that schools play an
important role in inculcating students with societal values.168 Contrary to
the vision of the school as a marketplace of ideas, education performs a
socializing function through which the basic norms and skills needed to
function in society are passed along to students. Additionally, this function
is meant to prepare young people for success in their future careers.
The Court in Brown v. Board of Education stated that the school “is a
principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing
him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to
his environment.”169 While not specifying what values are properly
imparted to children via public education,170 the Court has suggested that
society uses public education to pass along current values and norms, a
conservative notion that cuts against protection of a radical teacher freely
spreading her ideology among students at the expense of developing their
basic skills.
C. The Importance of Local Control
Finally, the Court has also been clear that judges are to defer to the
control of local authorities in management of schools and creation of their
curricula. Our federal system has largely left the implementation of public
education to local municipalities.171 These local entities are democratically
166

This Note does not argue that teachers in general deserve greater First Amendment rights than
other public employees for noncurricular speech—a teacher’s expression outside the classroom does not
implicate the separate interest of the state as educator.
167
Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603.
168
See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
169
Id.; see also Ambach, 441 U.S. at 77 (“Other authorities have perceived public schools as an
‘assimilative force’ by which diverse and conflicting elements in our society are brought together on a
broad but common ground. These perceptions of the public schools as inculcating fundamental values
necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system have been confirmed by the observations
of social scientists.” (citations omitted)).
170
In fact, the Court has placed a number of restrictions on the extent to which K–12 schools can
force students to conform to political or religious values. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103
(1968); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding that a requirement
that students recite the pledge of allegiance violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment).
171
Epperson, 393 U.S. at 104 (“By and large, public education in our Nation is committed to the
control of state and local authorities.”).
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elected, unlike individual teachers, and thus deserve substantial control
over the curriculum.172 Additionally, courts have expressed concern about
the inefficiency of judicial interference in the day-to-day operation of
schools.173 A standard is needed that balances these varying concerns,
allowing sufficient local control of the curriculum and its implementation
to ensure that students receive appropriate instruction and skill
development while also giving educators the ability to expose their students
to a variety of ideas vital to becoming good citizens.
D. Paradigmatic Problem Teachers
In addition to these broader interests, courts have worried that teachers
will abuse the captive audience found in a public school classroom.174
These concerns tend to fall along three main lines. I will refer to them as
the rogue teacher, the proselytizing teacher, and the inappropriate teacher.
Courts have expressed significant concern about teachers using
classroom time to discuss topics unrelated to the curriculum they were paid
to teach.175 This concern about rogue teachers has validity. Often, a school
is judged by how well its students perform on standardized tests and tailors
its curriculum to improve test scores. Thus, a teacher’s decision to deviate
from the curriculum for substantial periods can decrease those scores and
lower the reputation of the school. Additionally, many curricula are
designed so that courses build upon the knowledge a student should have
gained in prior years. For example, a calculus class would be ineffective if
the students’ algebra teachers had neglected to teach them how to factor.
Teachers simply disregarding the curriculum can thus harm both school
and student.

172

See Boring v. Buncombe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 371 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (“[I]t
is far better public policy . . . that the makeup of the curriculum be entrusted to the local school
authorities who are in some sense responsible, rather than to the teachers, who would be responsible
only to the judges, had they a First Amendment right to participate in the makeup of the curriculum.”).
173
See, e.g., Epperson, 393 U.S. at 104 (“Courts do not and cannot intervene in the resolution of
conflicts which arise in the daily operation of school systems and which do not directly and sharply
implicate basic constitutional values.”); Evans-Marshall II, 624 F.3d 332, 341 (6th Cir. 2010)
(expressing concern that First Amendment protection for curricular speech would turn “run-of-the-mine
curricular disputes into constitutional stalemates” requiring burdensome judicial oversight).
174
See Johnson v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d 954, 968 (9th Cir. 2011); Mayer v. Monroe
Cnty. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477, 480 (7th Cir. 2007).
175
See Mayer, 474 F.3d at 479 (“A teacher hired to lead a social-studies class can’t use it as a
platform for a revisionist perspective that Benedict Arnold wasn’t really a traitor, when the approved
program calls him one; a high-school teacher hired to explicate Moby-Dick in a literature class can’t
use Cry, The Beloved Country instead, even if Paton’s book better suits the instructor’s style and point
of view; a math teacher can’t decide that calculus is more important than trigonometry and decide to let
Hipparchus and Ptolemy slide in favor of Newton and Leibniz.”).
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Additionally, courts have seen potential danger in protecting a teacher
who uses his position as a pulpit.176 The trust imparted to teachers in
shaping the minds of students can easily be misused.177 Distinct from
simply exposing students to new ideas, educators may attempt to force their
own religious or political views on their pupils. This threat certainly poses
a real concern that teachers, cloaked in a degree of legitimacy and having
control over students’ grades, may be able to abuse their positions if given
overly broad free speech protections. To some, the answer to this problem
is to give expansive power to school boards: “[I]f indoctrination is likely,
the power should be reposed in someone the people can vote out of office,
rather than tenured teachers.”178 However, this approach raises significant
problems of its own, as majoritarian school boards could themselves
engage in attempts to indoctrinate students, possibly with greater effect
than a sole proselytizing teacher.179 Thus, any First Amendment standard

176

See Johnson, 658 F.3d at 957 (“We consider whether a public school district infringes the First
Amendment liberties of one of its teachers when it orders him not to use his public position as a pulpit
from which to preach his own views on the role of God in our Nation’s history to the captive students in
his mathematics classroom. The answer is clear: it does not.”); Mayer, 474 F.3d at 480 (“The
Constitution does not entitle teachers to present personal views to captive audiences against the
instructions of elected officials.”).
177
There are numerous examples of free speech challenges concerning teachers presenting
sectarian religious messages in their classrooms. See, e.g., Johnson, 658 F.3d at 958 (a math teacher had
several large posters emphasizing the role of God in America’s founding documents); Webster v. New
Lenox Sch. Dist. No. 122, 917 F.2d 1004, 1005–06 (7th Cir. 1990) (a teacher presented Christian
viewpoints on creation to his social studies class).
178
Mayer, 474 F.3d at 479–80.
179
The message of a single teacher can easily be ignored or countered by other teachers. However,
a school board can mandate policy for every teacher a child is exposed to—potentially creating the very
“pall of orthodoxy over the classroom” feared by the Court in Keyishian. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents,
385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). This is particularly true when the teachers lack First Amendment protection
for their curricular speech. While it is true that school boards are subject to democratic checks, some
locales have majoritarian support for highly political or sectarian ideas. For example, according to a
recent Gallup poll, 46% of Americans believe in new-earth creationism. Frank Newport, In U.S., 46%
Hold Creationist View of Human Origins, GALLUP (June 1, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/155003/
hold-creationist-view-human-origins.aspx. It is likely that this number surpasses 50% in certain regions.
Likewise, 52% of Republican voters in Mississippi polled in 2012 believed President Barack Obama is
a Muslim, while only 12% affirmatively believed that he practices his actual religion, Christianity.
Chris Moody, More than Half of Mississippi GOP Voters Say Obama is a Muslim, New Poll Suggests,
YAHOO! NEWS (Mar. 12, 2012), http://news.yahoo.com/blogs/ticket/poll-more-half-mississippi-votersobama-muslim-192027518.html. Furthermore, partisan behavior often makes its way into education
policy. In 2010 the Texas Board of Education approved a social studies curriculum that explicitly
required emphasis of “the superiority of American capitalism,” teaching of McCarthyism alongside
evidence of significant communist infiltration of government during the period, and teaching about “the
conservative resurgence of the 1980s,” including figures like Phyllis Schlafly, while removing Thomas
Jefferson from a list of figures who inspired eighteenth-century revolutions (likely due to his coining
the phrase “separation of church and state”). James C. McKinley Jr., Conservatives on Texas Panel
Carry the Day on Curriculum Change, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2010, at A10, available at http://www.
nytimes.com/2010/03/13/education/13texas.html. While the Court has rejected certain school board
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should work to prevent indoctrination of students by either teacher or
school board.
Finally, courts are concerned about a teacher who exposes students to
age-inappropriate material receiving First Amendment protection. There is
always a danger that a teacher may exercise poor judgment and expose
students to sexual or violent material that is inappropriate for their age or
for the school environment generally.180 For example, the First Circuit has
explicitly looked to the “age and sophistication” of students in determining
whether curricular speech is appropriate.181 Each of these concerns must be
addressed by any standard for determining whether the First Amendment
protects specific curricular speech.
III. A NEW STANDARD FOR CURRICULAR SPEECH
Educators in primary and secondary schools should be given limited
but well-defined First Amendment protections for their curricular speech.
This Note proposes that a new standard should be developed that accounts
for the competing interests and valid concerns regarding curricular speech
protection. This approach takes cues from Pickering and Hazelwood—in
particular, the First Circuit’s approach in Ward—to create a new test
specifically tailored for curricular speech in public schools.
A. The Proposed Test
Whether curricular speech implicates First Amendment protections
should be determined by balancing a teacher’s interest in speaking on
matters of legitimate pedagogical concern against the school’s interest in
providing an effective educational environment. This analysis would
proceed in two steps. First, it must be determined if there is a legitimate
pedagogical interest in an educator’s speech. This determination would be
made pursuant to two inquiries.
First, a court would ascertain whether the speech at issue is rationally
related to a teacher’s assigned curriculum or established school
programming.182 This inquiry is rather straightforward. A court would
determine what curriculum—as defined by the school board and the
decisions as violative of the Establishment Clause, see Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103 (1968),
this protection does not apply to political manipulation.
180
See, e.g., Silano v. Sag Harbor Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 42 F.3d 719, 721 (2d Cir.
1994) (showing a film clip with nude actors in a sophomore math class); Kenney v. Genesee Valley Bd.
of Coop. Educ. Servs., No. 07-CV-6442 CJS, 2008 WL 343110, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2008)
(showing a graphic clip of a man committing suicide to demonstrate the properties of ballistics).
181
Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 453 (1st Cir. 1993).
182
“School programming” refers to any initiative, activity, or sport specifically authorized by a
school. For example, many schools have character-education initiatives. By including these programs in
the test, teachers may receive protection in facilitating a discussion related to that initiative within their
classrooms.
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teacher’s supervisors in both written documents and informal
communications—the teacher was tasked with implementing at the time of
the speech in question. Then, the court would scrutinize the speech in
question and determine if it was rationally related to this curriculum.
Second, the court would determine whether the speech complied with
viewpoint-neutral school policies of which the teacher is on notice. School
policies could be ascertained from a variety of sources, including state
laws, employee manuals, office memoranda, and communications between
a teacher and his supervisors. Next, a court would determine if these
policies facially discriminated against a particular point of view. If so, the
policy would be invalid and excluded from the remainder of the analysis.
Finally, notice would be determined by examining whether a teacher would
be reasonably expected to have actual or constructive notice of the policy.
If the teacher’s speech meets both of these standards, the court would
then proceed to balance these interests against the school’s interest in
providing an effective educational environment. Schools are mandated with
providing the best education possible, and this standard specifically focuses
on the needs of students. If the speech at issue harms student learning—for
example, via poor quality instruction or introduction to age-inappropriate
material—that effect should factor into the courts’ ultimate determination.
Also relevant is whether the speech would emotionally harm a reasonable
student of that age. This standard explicitly targets harm to students, not
conflicts between teachers and either parents or supervisors.183
Additionally, if the school board or administrators specifically authorized
the speech at issue, a strong presumption should exist that the speech did
not harm the educational environment; both teacher and supervisor agreed
ex ante that the expression was acceptable.
B. Balancing in Practice
The operation of this test is best illustrated by applying it to existing
case law. While the published decisions in many past cases lack the
relevant facts needed for application of the proposed standard, several cases
provide opportunities to explore its operation—among these are Mayer v.
Monroe County Community School Corp.,184 Boring v. Buncombe County
Board of Education,185 and Johnson v. Poway Unified School District.186
The curricular speech found in Mayer would be protected under the
proposed standard. Ms. Mayer’s speech satisfies both inquiries in step one.
The discussion of peace was rationally related to her curriculum; the
183

While parents are not included explicitly in this test, their views in the aggregate are included
by proxy. Parents can and do participate in the operation of local schools through school board meetings
and elections, which directly impact the specific curricular choices of a district.
184
474 F.3d 477 (7th Cir. 2007).
185
136 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
186
658 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2011).
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newsletter that contained the article on peace protests was a part of her
curriculum.187 Also, the record does not indicate that a school policy
requiring her to avoid discussion of peace, the Iraq War, or personal
political opinions generally had been communicated to the staff at the time
of her speech. Even if her principal’s later ban on discussing peace had
been in place at the time, her speech would still be protected because the
policy lacked viewpoint neutrality.188 Only a policy banning all discussion
of the war or political beliefs would disqualify the speech from protection.
In step two, there is no evidence in the case that her speech damaged the
learning environment for her students. The speech at issue was very brief,
and complaints came only from one set of parents with opposing political
viewpoints, not her students.189
Similarly, the curricular speech in Boring would likely be protected
under this standard. In choosing a play for her high school theater class,
Ms. Boring was carrying out the curriculum assigned to her. Not only did
she comply with school policies, she actually got permission from her
supervisor in advance of choosing the play.190 While a colorable argument
can be made that exposure to a play involving teen pregnancy,
homosexuality, and dysfunctional families could be emotionally harmful,
this would be unlikely to succeed. First, the school principal specifically
authorized the performance of the play, creating a strong presumption that
the play was not harmful. Additionally, participants in the play were high
school students in an advanced acting class191 (likely an elective)—students
of that age are generally aware of issues pertaining to sexuality and family
strife.
The facts of Johnson demonstrate a scenario in which curricular
speech falls outside the scope of the First Amendment. In Johnson, a high
school mathematics teacher was forced to remove several large banners
that emphasized the importance of God in America’s founding
documents.192 This speech fails both step-one inquiries. Even if the speech
were found to be political rather than religious, it bore no rational
relationship to the teaching of mathematics. Also, both preexisting school
district policy and state law of which the teacher should have been aware
contained provisions prohibiting the expression.193 Thus, this speech would
not be protected.
187

See Mayer v. Monroe Cnty. Cmty. Sch. Corp., No. 1:04-CV-1695-SEB-VSS, 2006 WL 693555,
at *2 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 10, 2006).
188
See id. at *3.
189
Id. at *2–3.
190
Boring, 136 F.3d at 375–76 (Motz, J., dissenting).
191
See id. at 366 (majority opinion).
192
See Johnson v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d 954, 957–59 (9th Cir. 2011).
193
See id. at 959. The school policy instructed teachers to “refrain from using classroom teacher
influence to promote partisan or sectarian viewpoints” and the state law stated that religious references
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These examples demonstrate how the proposed standard would deal
with past cases. With the basic operation of the test illustrated, the next
section will examine its potential benefits and drawbacks.
C. Benefits of the Proposed Approach
The proposed test provides a limited but well-defined protection for
curricular speech that has a number of distinct advantages over existing
approaches. These benefits fall into three general categories: (1) proper
balancing of interests, (2) a focus on institutional competency, and (3)
practical benefits for educators. Each of these categories shall be discussed
in turn.
First, this test properly balances the tension between maintaining a
marketplace of ideas in schools with proper deference to local control and
the need for basic socialization. The very existence of protection for
curricular speech promotes the marketplace of ideas. More specifically, a
teacher’s ability to speak on matters rationally related to her curriculum
ensures that any topic assigned to her can be viewed from multiple
perspectives. Though the school can still create a policy limiting certain
speech, it must do so on a viewpoint-neutral basis; the school may be able
to prevent Ms. Mayer from discussing the Iraq War, but if she is allowed to
discuss it, she can expose students to multiple perspectives, lessening
concerns about indoctrination. However, the balancing step prevents this
protection from becoming overly inclusive; speech that would harm a
reasonable student or that simply demonstrates poor quality of instruction
would fall outside the First Amendment.
Additionally, using the established curriculum as the anchor of
protection gives proper deference to the control of local authorities. The
curriculum assigned to a teacher embodies the will of the local school
board and state authorities. A school board can then specify which topics it
does and does not want covered. A school that wants to exert greater
control over the content of a politically charged subject, like American
government, can give very specific instructions, while a school that wants
to give its teachers more leeway can give broad directives. Likewise,
excluding speech unrelated to the curriculum ensures the First Amendment
will not become an excuse for teachers to neglect developing their students’
basic skills.
It could be argued that the proposed standard actually provides too
much deference to local control. As the standard for First Amendment
protection varies with school board decisions about curriculum and policy,
schools could theoretically put in place draconian measures to limit a
teacher’s autonomy. Several factors work as a check against this kind of

are proper only when “incidental to or illustrative of matters properly included in the course of study.”
Id. at 959 & n.5 (citing CAL. EDUC. CODE § 51511 (West 2006)).
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control. First, the test itself requires viewpoint neutrality in regulations—if
the policy is facially biased toward a particular political party or religious
sect, a teacher’s speech may still be protected. A school would have to limit
speech on topics it does want to promote in order to suppress the speech it
dislikes, increasing the burden in imposing a limit. Also, there are
constitutional limitations on the conduct of school boards that come from
outside the Free Speech Clause; both the First Amendment’s Establishment
Clause194 and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause195 have
been used to limit the actions of local education authorities and can check
the most egregious actions.
Finally, a practical check on school boards imposing draconian
limitations is the threat of diminishing educational quality. School boards
and administrators have a strong interest in the performance of their
students; poor performance can cost them their jobs through political
pressure or legal sanction.196 If a good teacher feels overly burdened by
regulation, he can take his talents elsewhere. Inferior teaching quality can
substantially lower student achievement.197 The interests of administrators
and school boards in providing a quality education would act as a check
against abuse.
Also, requiring curricular speech to comply with school policy allows
school administrators to set basic standards for educator conduct. A school
would be free to require special permission for movies of a certain rating,
ban the use of profanity, as well as prohibit teachers from advancing their
own sectarian beliefs in classrooms. Policies of this sort would prevent an
inappropriate teacher or proselytizing teacher from receiving First
Amendment protection. Also, this approach naturally accounts for a
student’s increasing maturity, as curricula tend to be set for specific courses
offered to students of specific ages. The rational relationship requirement
also accounts for the problem of rogue teachers; spending class time
exploring topics unrelated to their curriculum would fail this test.
Second, the proposed standard is consistent with the differing
competencies of educators and courts. At base, schools are experts in
194

See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103 (1968) (holding a state statute that prohibited
teaching evolution in public schools unconstitutional on Establishment Clause grounds).
195
See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399–400, 403 (1923) (holding that a Nebraska law
outlawing foreign language education violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
196
See supra note 15 and accompanying text discussing the punishments that can result from
failure to comply with No Child Left Behind.
197
A recent empirical study relating student outcomes to teacher quality demonstrated that
replacing a poor teacher with a higher quality one would increase the net lifetime income of a single
class by more that $250,000. Raj Chetty et al., The Long-Term Impacts of Teachers: Teacher ValueAdded and Student Outcomes in Adulthood 47 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
17699, 2011), available at http://obs.rc.fas.harvard.edu/chetty/value_added.pdf. Students with higher
quality teachers are also more likely to go to college and less likely to have children as teenagers than
their similarly situated peers. See id. at 4, 36.
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pedagogy and courts are experts in legal analysis. This test places the core
pedagogical determinations in the hands of the schools. Instead of allowing
courts to speculate about what a legitimate pedagogical purpose is, this
standard allows educators creating a curriculum or a school policy to make
the relevant determinations; schools are in charge of creating both the
curricula and the policies that underpin the two inquiries into legitimate
pedagogical concern. The court then takes this curriculum and policy and
relates them to the facts of the case using well-established modes of legal
analysis: determining rational relationships,198 evaluating viewpoint
neutrality,199 determining whether the language of a text reaches a particular
situation,200 and balancing competing interests.201
Finally, this new standard would create several additional practical
benefits for educators. First, the standard is written in language that
teachers and administrators can understand. The vast majority of teachers
have never taken a class in law,202 but they do know the ins and outs of their
schools’ curricula and policies. Teachers can be confident in employing
diverse methods in the classroom if they teach their assigned curriculum
and follow school rules. Conversely, administrators gain clarity regarding
the circumstances under which they can take disciplinary action against a
teacher without violating the Constitution. Additionally, the first step’s
notice requirement incentivizes schools to develop clear, wellcommunicated polices. This approach would encourage schools to be
proactive and create policies (preferably written) that are clearly
communicated to their staffs to avoid potential liability. This new standard

198

See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (holding that rational basis review under
the Equal Protection Clause requires a classification to bear a “rational relationship to legitimate state
interests”).
199
See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985)
(“Control over access to a nonpublic forum can be based on subject matter and speaker identity so long
as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint
neutral.”).
200
See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984) (requiring that courts, in
evaluating agency regulations, determine “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question
at issue”). The first step in this proposed test actually bears a resemblance to Chevron analysis. In both,
an elected body (Congress or a school board) has delegated some of its authority to another party
(agency or a teacher). The court determines whether or not a statement by the elected body (law or
curriculum) has directly addressed an act by the party (rulemaking or curricular speech) to whom that
body has delegated authority. If the elected body has not spoken to the act, then the court determines if
the party acted reasonably given its prior direction. Cf. id. at 842–44.
201
See, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (balancing public employees’
speech interests against public employers’ interest in the efficiency of public services).
202
One study found that 75% of teachers have never taken a class in school law. David Schimmel
& Matthew Militello, Legal Literacy for Teachers: A Neglected Responsibility, 77 HARV. EDUC.
REV. 257, 262 (2007). Even with a basic understanding of legal concepts, the convoluted nature of First
Amendment protection under current law would likely make it difficult for educators to know what the
First Amendment does and does not protect.
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for curricular speech would give educators much-needed certainty
concerning their First Amendment rights.
CONCLUSION
The long-term economic and political success of the United States
rests largely on the shoulders of our public education system. Teachers are
on the front lines of public education and should be able to expose young
people to a wide variety of ideas within the bounds of the curriculum they
are assigned to teach. Currently, First Amendment jurisprudence in this
area is deeply conflicted and poorly developed. This Note proposes a new
standard specifically designed for the realities of public schools: balancing
a teacher’s interest in speaking on matters of legitimate pedagogical
concern against the school’s interest in providing an effective educational
environment. Determining what is a matter of legitimate pedagogical
concern is not left to jurists but to pedagogues through the creation of
curriculum and viewpoint-neutral school policies.
This new standard for curricular speech is designed to maintain a
marketplace of ideas within America’s schools while still respecting the
important socializing function of schools and giving deference to local
control. By providing clear, but limited, protection for a teacher’s curricular
speech, this standard would provide much-needed clarity to this area of the
law and limit the ability of majoritarian bodies to “cast a pall of orthodoxy”
over the nation’s public schools.203

203

Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
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